LAGOS, Nigeria – Nearly a decade after Nigeria launched one of Africa’s most ambitious deradicalisation and reintegration programmes for former insurgents, communities once scarred by Boko Haram continue to grapple with terrorism, banditry and kidnapping. While thousands of ex-fighters have reportedly passed through rehabilitation, fresh attacks have fuelled doubts over whether the initiative has delivered lasting peace or merely postponed the threat. In this report, Korede Abdullah examines whether Nigeria’s investment in rehabilitation has translated into safer communities—or whether justice, accountability and long-term security remain unfinished business.
Nearly 10 years after the Federal Government introduced Operation Safe Corridor and other deradicalisation initiatives, Nigeria’s security landscape remains deeply uncertain.
The programme was designed to persuade members of Boko Haram and other extremist groups to renounce violence, undergo rehabilitation and return to civilian life. It was also intended to weaken insurgent networks, reduce recruitment and create conditions for lasting peace in communities devastated by years of conflict.
Yet, despite the reported reintegration of thousands of former insurgents, violent attacks continue to claim lives across parts of the North-East, while banditry, kidnapping and other forms of organised violence have spread into several regions of the country.
The persistence of insecurity has reignited a difficult national conversation: has Nigeria’s deradicalisation strategy achieved its objectives, or has it exposed the limits of rehabilitation in the absence of broader security reforms?
Security experts say the answer lies somewhere between success and failure.
While the programme has encouraged defections and yielded valuable intelligence for security agencies, they argue that rehabilitation alone cannot end an insurgency rooted in ideology, poverty, weak governance and fragile state institutions.
Rehabilitation Without Lasting Peace?
Security analyst Mr Opeyemi Oyerinde believes Nigeria’s deradicalisation programme has made measurable contributions to the fight against terrorism but says those gains should not be mistaken for a comprehensive security solution.
Speaking exclusively to Africa Health Report, he argued that while rehabilitation has encouraged thousands of insurgents to surrender, it has worked alongside other decisive factors, including sustained military operations, improved intelligence and internal divisions within extremist groups.
According to him: “The programme has only partially achieved its objectives. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that it has independently reduced terrorist attacks. Military offensives, intelligence-led operations and internal divisions within insurgent groups have also played significant roles in weakening the insurgency.”
For Oyerinde, attributing improvements in security solely to Operation Safe Corridor risks oversimplifying a conflict that has evolved over more than a decade.
He noted that military pressure has forced many insurgents to surrender, while factional disputes within extremist groups have weakened their operational capacity.
Nevertheless, he acknowledged that the programme has delivered important operational benefits.
Intelligence from Former Fighters
One of the clearest achievements of the initiative, Oyerinde said, has been its contribution to intelligence gathering.
Former insurgents, he explained, have provided security agencies with valuable information about terrorist camps, recruitment networks, supply routes and operational tactics, allowing security forces to plan more targeted operations.
“The programme has helped encourage defections and weakened insurgent ranks, but it cannot, by itself, deliver lasting peace,” he said.
“Lasting security will require a comprehensive approach that combines effective military operations, justice, economic development, good governance and strong community engagement.”
His assessment reflects a broader consensus among security analysts that deradicalisation should be viewed as one element of a wider counterterrorism strategy rather than a substitute for it.
The Reintegration Challenge
If persuading insurgents to surrender represents the first phase of the programme, successfully reintegrating them into society remains its greatest test.
Oyerinde identified post-reintegration monitoring as one of the weakest links in Nigeria’s current approach.
According to him, there is no comprehensive system for tracking rehabilitated participants after they leave the programme, making it difficult to assess whether they remain committed to peaceful lives or eventually return to violent extremism.
He warned that another obstacle lies within the communities expected to receive them.
Many victims and survivors remain deeply traumatised and view the return of former insurgents with suspicion, fear and resentment.
“Community rejection could increase the risk of social isolation and possible re-radicalisation,” he warned.
For that reason, he believes deradicalisation cannot succeed without the active participation of traditional rulers, religious leaders and community organisations capable of rebuilding trust between former fighters and the communities they once terrorised.
Can Peace Ignore Justice?
Beyond questions of security, Oyerinde argues that public confidence in the programme has been undermined by perceptions of unequal treatment.
Many Nigerians, he said, believe former insurgents receive rehabilitation, vocational training and government support while victims continue to struggle with little compensation or long-term assistance.
“Victims deserve justice, compensation and rehabilitation just as much as former fighters require reintegration,” he said.
He insists that rehabilitation must never replace accountability for serious crimes.
“Those responsible for murder, rape and mass abductions must face due process, while reintegration should be reserved for individuals who qualify under the law.”
His remarks expose one of the programme’s most difficult dilemmas: how can a country pursue reconciliation without leaving victims feeling abandoned, and how can it encourage peace without weakening confidence in justice?
Those questions become even more pressing as security experts continue to debate whether rehabilitation alone can prevent the next generation of violent extremism—or whether Nigeria must fundamentally rethink its approach to counterterrorism.
Balancing Rehabilitation with Accountability
For retired military officer Rufai Kareem, deradicalisation is neither a flawed concept nor a guaranteed solution. Its success, he argues, depends on credibility, transparency and public trust.
Speaking with Africa Health Report, Kareem described rehabilitation as a recognised counterterrorism strategy adopted in different parts of the world to encourage violent extremists to abandon their ideology. However, he stressed that its effectiveness rests on the government’s ability to distinguish those who have genuinely renounced violence from those who should face prosecution.
“Deradicalisation is not a bad idea in itself. Around the world, countries have adopted rehabilitation programmes to encourage violent extremists to abandon their ideology. However, the process must be thorough, credible and backed by proper risk assessment. Society must be convinced that those returning no longer pose a security threat,” he said.
For Kareem, rebuilding public confidence is as important as rehabilitating former fighters.
Communities devastated by years of violence, he said, deserve assurance that the pursuit of peace has not come at the expense of justice.
“Reintegration should never be treated as an automatic entitlement for former insurgents,” he said.
“Justice and national security must go hand in hand. Victims who lost family members, homes and livelihoods deserve to see that accountability has not been sacrificed in the name of rehabilitation. Where there is evidence of serious crimes, the law must take its course.”
Beyond the Camps
Experts say one of the greatest tests of any deradicalisation programme begins after participants leave rehabilitation centres.
Successful reintegration depends not only on vocational training or psychological counselling, but also on whether communities are prepared to accept former insurgents, whether victims receive adequate support, and whether security agencies can sustain long-term monitoring.
Without those safeguards, analysts warn, rehabilitation risks becoming an isolated intervention rather than a lasting solution.
They argue that countering violent extremism requires a broader strategy that combines effective security operations with education, economic opportunities, community engagement and accountable governance.
Such an approach addresses not only those who have abandoned insurgent groups, but also the conditions that allow extremist ideologies to take root in the first place.
The View from Those Who Survived
For many victims of insurgency and kidnapping, the debate over deradicalisation extends beyond policy.
It is deeply personal.
To families who have buried loved ones, lost homes or endured years of displacement, questions about rehabilitation are inseparable from demands for justice, truth and recognition.
Many continue to ask whether enough has been done to support those who suffered while attention and resources are directed towards rehabilitating former fighters.
Security experts argue that answering those concerns is essential to rebuilding public trust.
Communities that feel ignored or excluded, they say, are less likely to embrace reintegration efforts, increasing the risk of resentment and social division.
A Decade Later, Has Nigeria Become Safer?
Nearly ten years after Operation Safe Corridor was introduced, there is broad agreement that the programme has produced measurable achievements.
It has encouraged defections, generated valuable intelligence and offered some former insurgents an opportunity to abandon violence.
Yet those gains have not eliminated the insecurity that continues to threaten many parts of the country.
Armed attacks, mass abductions and organised criminal violence remain persistent challenges, while concerns over community acceptance, post-reintegration monitoring and support for victims continue to shape public debate.
For many analysts, these realities suggest that deradicalisation should not be judged in isolation.
Its success ultimately depends on the strength of the wider institutions surrounding it—from the military and intelligence services to the justice system, local communities and government agencies responsible for rebuilding lives after conflict.
The Measure of Peace
The story of Nigeria’s deradicalisation programme is not simply about former insurgents. It is about the country’s broader search for lasting peace after years of conflict.
Rehabilitation may persuade individuals to lay down their weapons, but sustainable security depends on something far more demanding: protecting communities, delivering justice, restoring public confidence and addressing the conditions that fuel extremism.
As Nigeria continues to invest in deradicalisation, the question is no longer whether former fighters can be rehabilitated. The more pressing challenge is whether the country can build institutions strong enough to ensure that violence does not simply re-emerge in another form.
Nearly a decade after the programme began, the measure of its success cannot be found solely in the number of insurgents who have completed rehabilitation. It must also be seen in whether families can return home without fear, whether survivors believe justice has been served, and whether children can grow up in communities where peace is not temporary, but enduring.
Until those questions are answered, Nigeria’s deradicalisation journey will remain a work in progress—one that reflects not only the complexities of counterterrorism, but also the difficult choices every society must make between reconciliation, accountability and the pursuit of lasting security.
